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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
The minimum coverage provision does not require individuals to purchase any unique product or
service but rather requires a standardized financial
contribution to the national healthcare infrastructure
from all legal residents who are able to pay – a kind
of requirement that has never been found unduly or
even unusually restrictive of individual liberty.
The question presented is whether the Eleventh
Circuit erred in finding that the minimum coverage
provision’s implications for individual liberty support
a holding of constitutional invalidity under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The amici Jewish organizations represent a tradition of believing that the community has an essential role in providing for the sick. Preserving life and
health is one of the highest of communal duties in the
Jewish tradition, taking precedence even over the construction of a synagogue. These petitioners represent
a minority community deeply committed to individual
rights, including the right of privacy and the right
of the individual to express choices of conscience in
healthcare matters. Petitioners would oppose any sacrifice of genuinely fundamental individual rights in
an effort to address the health care crisis.
The Jewish Alliance for Law and Social
Action (JALSA) is a membership-based non-profit
organization based in Boston working for social and
economic justice, civil rights, and civil liberties for all
peoples. Inspired by Jewish teachings and values,
they have sought to achieve universal access and
improvement of health outcomes through grassroots
action, strategic coalition-building, and legislative
initiatives. The organization was involved in the
passage of the Massachusetts statute that served as a
model for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA).
1

This brief is submitted with the consent of the parties, as
lodged with the Clerk per the Docket Sheets. Pursuant to Rule
37.6, counsel represent that this brief was not authored in whole
or in part by counsel for any party. Amici have borne their own
expenses, without support from any party.

2
The Jewish Council on Urban Affairs (JCUA)
combats poverty, racism and anti-Semitism in partnership with diverse communities in the Chicago area
and beyond. Guided by prophetic Jewish principles,
JCUA pursues social and economic justice for those
who are most vulnerable by promoting a vision of empowering communities from within. Since its founding in 1964, JCUA has assisted groups in low-income
communities and communities of color, built coalitions with diverse groups, advocated on issues of
human rights, poverty and racism, and mobilized a
Jewish constituency to create a more just world for
all.
The Jewish Social Policy Action Network
(JSPAN) is a non-profit organization working out of
Philadelphia dedicated to protecting the constitutional and civil rights of minorities and the vulnerable. JSPAN utilizes education, testimony, amicus
curiae briefs and permissible grassroots organizing to
support the separation of church and state, to advance individual rights under law, and generally to
pursue tikkun olam, the “repair of the world.” JSPAN
supports the availability of adequate healthcare, and
health insurance in particular, to all Americans and
has consistently supported the principles expressed in
the ACA.
The New England Jewish Labor Committee
(JLC) is the voice of the Jewish community in the
labor movement and the voice of the labor movement
in the Jewish community. By engaging the Jewish
community in support of issues affecting working

3
people and the labor movement, the JLC enables the
Jewish community and the trade union movement to
work together on important issues of shared interest
and concern, in pursuit of our shared commitment to
economic and social justice. Access to universal, quality, affordable healthcare is seen as a critical social
justice goal.
Professor Abigail R. Moncrieff is Peter Paul
Career Development Professor and Associate Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law,
and she proudly joins these civil rights and civil
liberties organizations as an amicus. Professor
Moncrieff teaches and writes in the fields of healthcare law, federalism, and constitutional law, and she
has written extensively on the liberty implications
of the minimum coverage provision as well as on
the federalism implications of the ACA. Professor
Moncrieff therefore has a strong professional interest
in the outcome of this case, as well as a personal
pecuniary interest in the continuing security of the
healthcare infrastructure. She joins this brief together with her students, Zoë Sajor, Rachel Smit, and
Emily Westfall, whom she thanks for their excellent
research assistance. Professor Moncrieff ’s relevant
scholarly works are available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=784767.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In its analysis of the minimum coverage provision, the Eleventh Circuit mischaracterized the statute’s implications for individual liberty, both in terms
of the provision’s substantive intrusion on individual
freedom and in terms of its structural incursion on
state power to protect that freedom. As a result, the
Court reached the wrong decision on the merits of the
Article I challenge.
Although respondents do not argue that the socalled “individual mandate” violates any protectable
rights, they do argue – and the Eleventh Circuit held
– that the provision’s implications for liberty support
invalidation under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause. The Eleventh Circuit correctly
noted that, under this Court’s precedent, concerns
about liberty often shape federalism doctrine. But the
Court has emphasized such concerns only in a limited
set of federalism cases: those in which the national
government has exerted a kind of control that falls
within the states’ traditional police power.
The individual mandate is not such a law. Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s assertions, the minimum coverage provision does not require individuals
to purchase any particular product. It is, instead,
merely a requirement for individual financial participation in the national healthcare infrastructure,
much like a tax. The provision is thus a kind of
regulatory control that does not, under this Court’s
precedent, raise rights-based concerns.

5
Furthermore, although the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) certainly increases the
federal government’s involvement in insurance regulation, the statute preserves significant state authority over both health insurance and healthcare.
Beyond the federally-mandated financial contribution, individuals remain free to choose among many
insurance products for structuring their healthcare
payments and free to choose whatever courses of
medical treatment they prefer, subject almost entirely
to state rather than federal definition.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MISCHARACTERIZED THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION’S IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTY.

In holding that the minimum coverage provision
(“provision” or “individual mandate”), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A, of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(ACA),2 is unconstitutional under Article I, see U.S.
Const. art I., § 8, the Eleventh Circuit hinged its
analysis on the provision’s implications for individual
liberty. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1284, 1291-92
2

Amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.

6
(11th Cir. 2011) (noting at the outset that the “ultimate goal” of “structural constitutional limitations” is
“the protection of individual liberty” and that the
mandate’s perceived intrusion on freedom “strikes at
the very heart of whether Congress has acted within
its enumerated power”).
Although the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted
that one purpose of our government’s federal structure is to protect freedom, the majority opinion made
a critical error that led it to the wrong result on the
merits: It misunderstood the basic nature and function of the minimum coverage provision. When properly characterized as a requirement for individual
financial contribution to the national healthcare infrastructure rather than as a requirement for individual purchase of a unique product or individual
consumption of a given commodity, the provision
poses neither a threat to liberty nor a threat to federalism.
As civil rights and civil liberties organizations
dedicated to improving access to high quality healthcare, amici are interested in both the protection of
liberty from government and the facilitation of liberty
through government. The federal structure serves
both purposes, and it is vital that all units of government – Congress, the Executive, and this Court alike
– strike an appropriate balance between limiting
intervention and respecting regulation. With the ACA,
Congress wrote a well-balanced law that supports
a high quality healthcare infrastructure without

7
unduly restricting states’ or individuals’ power to
satisfy their needs and preferences.
A. Although Liberty is a Legitimate Concern in Federalism Analysis, the Liberty
Interests that Have Been Relevant in
this Context Are Those that Relate to
the Core Police Power of the States.
A general principle of individual freedom undoubtedly underlies our government’s federal structure. In part, federalism serves simply to slow down
regulatory decisionmaking, to make restrictive interventions harder to pass. More importantly, though,
federalism serves to place the most intrusive forms of
regulatory power into the hands of smaller governments so that individuals are better represented in
the regulatory processes that lead to their forfeitures
of freedom, particularly their imprisonment. See
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)
(noting that state governments allow individuals to
make their voices heard “without having to rely solely
upon the political processes that control a remote
central power”).
In keeping with the latter point, this Court has
stressed the importance of federalism to liberty only
when the national government has exerted a kind of
control that belongs with the states’ police power:
regulations related to education, public health,
and public safety. Indeed, all Supreme Court cases
that have noted the interrelationship of liberty and

8
federalism have involved federal attempts to regulate
public safety. See Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (criminal
chemical weapons ban); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (private right of action for victims
of domestic violence); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997) (background checks for gun sales); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (criminal prohibition on firearm possession near schools); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (regulation of
nuclear waste disposal); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) (interpreting a federal statute to
preserve a state public health regulation: a mandatory retirement age for state judges).
By contrast, this Court does not emphasize libertarian3 implications in federalism cases that center
on purely financial regulations, such as taxes or other
kinds of mandatory contributions, even when those
financial regulations intend to affect individual behavior. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12
(1987), for example, the Court confronted the view
that the federal government’s effective taxation of
states for refusing to change the drinking age raised
concerns about state freedom, and it squarely rejected
the argument. The Court noted that constitutional
limits have always relied on “ ‘a robust common sense
which assumes the freedom of the will [to reject mere
3

Throughout this brief, we use “libertarian” in its small-l
sense, to mean “related to liberty.” We do not mean to refer to
the Libertarian Party or to the broader political movement that
has now come to be associated with the Tea Party.

9
financial incentives] as a working hypothesis.’ ” Id.
(quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
590 (1937)).
In short, the virtues of the states as subunits of
government, providing citizens with greater opportunities of voice, diversity, and exit than they have at
the national level, are important to individual freedom when the regulation at issue is truly coercive –
when it is one that has historically fallen within the
states’ police power. Financial regulations are capable
of raising the same kinds of libertarian concerns only
if they reach a magnitude of intervention at which
“ ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ ” Dole, 483 U.S. at
211 (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590). But
universal obligations for financial participation that
are well-calibrated and minimally intrusive, like
ordinary taxes, have never been thought to raise
libertarian concerns or to require state control. The
Eleventh Circuit’s apparent holding to the contrary
constitutes a dramatic departure from this Court’s
longstanding and consistent precedent.
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision is a
Well-Calibrated and Non-Coercive Requirement for Financial Participation
in the National Healthcare Infrastructure, Which Does Not Implicate State
Police Power.
Given the role that liberty has played in federalism cases, the respondents would need to establish that the minimum coverage provision either is
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non-financial or is truly coercive in order to establish
that libertarian concerns can justify their narrow
reading of Article I. But the mandate is, in fact,
purely financial and not at all coercive.
Notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit’s and the
respondents’ insistence to the contrary, the individual
mandate does not require individuals to buy any
particular product or service. Instead, it merely
requires legal residents of the United States to contribute some money to the national healthcare infrastructure, either by paying into a private insurance
pool of the individual’s choice or by making an equivalent or lesser “shared responsibility payment” to the
national treasury. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b); § 5000A(c)(1)
(capping possible penalties at the cost of an average
private plan). Importantly, the maximum amount
that the mandate requires any individual to pay is
the average cost of the least-comprehensive level of
private insurance coverage, § 5000A(c)(1)(B), meaning that individuals are not financially penalized for
choosing to give their money to the federal fisc instead of giving it to private insurance. The only thing
that self-insured individuals forfeit by choosing a
shared responsibility payment over an insurance
contract is the private insurance coverage, but that
forfeiture is not a penalty at all for individuals like
the respondents, who prefer to remain self-insured,
see Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1270-71 (N.D.
Fla. 2011) (describing the allegations of two plaintiffs
who claim to prefer self-insurance), aff ’d in part,
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rev’d in part sub nom. Florida, 648 F.3d 1235. Given
the magnitude of the penalty and its statutory calibration to private insurance premiums, the minimum
coverage provision requires nothing more or less than
a universal, standardized contribution to the healthcare infrastructure from all legal residents who are
able to pay.4
In this sense, the individual mandate is, as far as
its effect on liberty is concerned, indistinguishable
from an ordinary tax.5 Although the mandate functions slightly differently from ordinary taxes – as
we will discuss shortly – its effects on individual
liberty are fundamentally the same. Indeed, Congress
was aware that the mandate resembles a tax for
liberty purposes; the provision contains a religious
exemption that simply cross-references the Internal
4

The mandate excuses from this financial contribution
legal residents who have public healthcare through the Military
Health System (TRICARE) and Veterans Affairs. See 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A(f )(1)(A)(iv)-(v). Those individuals, though, have earned
their public benefit through their service and have supported
the national infrastructure in other ways. Others are excused
from the contribution only if they are unable to pay, like Medicaid enrollees, § 5000A(f)(1)(A)(ii), if they have paid into the
system through prior taxation, like Medicare enrollees,
§ 5000A(f )(1)(A)(i), or if they fall into limited statutory exemptions, § 5000A(e).
5
This brief does not argue that the individual mandate is a
tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act or the Article I taxing
power. The point here is only that the mandate’s imposition on
liberty is no greater or lesser than that of a standard tax, which
would be true even if the mandate constituted a commercial
regulation rather than a tax.
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Revenue Code’s general religious exemption for selfemployed individuals. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)
(cross-referencing 26 U.S.C.A. § 1402(g)(1)). The
religious exemption, thus, relates only to financial
contribution, not to enrollment in health insurance,
because financial contribution is all that the mandate
ultimately requires.
The federal government compels residents to contribute to countless national infrastructures on which
they might or might not individually rely, including
the military, highway, telecommunications, ecological,
agricultural, and energy infrastructures, among many
others, and the individual mandate simply adds the
healthcare infrastructure to that list. Cf. Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 564 (6th Cir.
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that the mandate is no more intrusive than the many tax laws
requiring individuals to “spend money on things they
may not need”), petition for cert. pending, No.11-117
(filed July 26, 2011).
Of course, there is an obvious arguable distinction between the individual mandate and ordinary
taxation (at least as taxation is commonly perceived):
The minimum coverage provision relies on private
entities to maintain the healthcare infrastructure
rather than relying on public entities like the United
States military. It is this difference more than any
other that seemingly motivated the Eleventh Circuit to decry the individual mandate as a “novel”
attempt to “compel” individuals “to enter the stream
of commerce.” See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1291-92

13
(“Individuals subjected to this economic mandate
have not made a voluntary choice to enter the stream
of commerce, but instead are having that choice imposed upon them by the federal government.”); id. at
1328 (“This economic mandate represents a wholly
novel and potentially unbounded assertion of congressional authority: the ability to compel Americans
to buy an expensive health insurance product they
have elected not to buy. . . .”).
But this arguable distinction is a false one. Many
of our most important national infrastructures rely
on private contractors for their primary support.
Private utility companies are responsible for many
states’ energy infrastructures; private construction
contractors maintain the highway and transportation infrastructures; private telephone and internet
providers own the telecommunications infrastructure; private environmental consultants safeguard
the ecological infrastructure; private farmers own
the agricultural infrastructure. And even the military
sometimes relies on private contractors to support its
efforts, as the public learned in the Blackwater
Security scandal, see Associated Press, U.S. Embassy
Resumes Use of Blackwater Security, U.S.A. Today,
Sept. 21, 2007. See generally Gillian E. Metzger,
Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367
(2003) (discussing governmental reliance on private
contractors and its implications for structural constitutional limits). General tax dollars, collected compulsorily from all Americans, support these private
companies without raising liberty-based constitutional
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concerns – without provoking accusations that these
programs force unwilling Americans “to enter the
stream of commerce.” Florida, 648 F.3d at 1292.
Importantly, the federal Medicare program also
relies on private insurance companies, called “Medicare Administrative Contractors,” to manage the part
of the healthcare infrastructure that serves the
elderly and disabled populations. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Part A/Part B Medicare
Administrative Contractor (Sept. 21, 2011). Under
Medicare, the government forcibly collects tax dollars
from all individuals working in the United States
and uses those dollars to pay private health insurance companies to administer enrollees’ benefits. This
point might help to explain why a protester infamously
commanded Representative Robert Inglis to “keep
your government hands off my Medicare,” Phillip
Rucker, Sen. DeMint of S.C. Is Voice of Opposition
to Health-Care Reform, Wash. Post, July 28, 2009, at
A1 (“At a recent town-hall meeting in suburban
Simpsonville[, S.C.], a man stood up and told Rep.
Robert Inglis (R-S.C.) to ‘keep your government
hands off my Medicare.’ ”), but it raises the question
of why such protesters do not, either when paying
Medicare payroll taxes or when enrolling in the mandatory Medicare Part A program for hospitalization
benefits, complain that they are being forced to “enter
the stream of commerce.” Florida, 648 F.3d at 1292.
The difference might be that, when paying Medicare taxes, the money goes first to the federal
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government and only later to the Medicare Administrative Contractor, making the Medicare payments
more obviously taxation. The minimum coverage
provision, by contrast, cuts out the middle man of the
federal government for those individuals who choose
private insurance contracts over shared responsibility
payments, effectively enlisting a network of private
contracts as a public program. But that strategy for
a public infrastructure is far from novel.
Even during the height of the Lochner era, see
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), this Court
recognized that some private industries were so “impressed with a public interest” that they were essentially public in nature – sufficiently so that they could
be rate-regulated despite the then-robust freedom of
contract doctrine. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C.,
261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113 (1876)), overruled in part by West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The paradigmatic example of such quasi-public entities is the
common carrier – railroads, airlines, and the like –
but the public interest exception to the freedom of
contract also extended to bakers, warehouses, innkeepers, and many others. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 125
(“[I]t has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen,
bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in
so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for
services rendered, accommodations furnished, and
articles sold.”).
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Crucially for present purposes, the same exception applied to insurers. See O’Gorman & Young, Inc.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257 (1931)
(holding that “[t]he business of insurance is so far
affected with a public interest that the State may
regulate the rates” (citing German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914))). In fact, the Lochnerera Supreme Court explicitly analogized private
insurance to taxation, reasoning:
The effect of insurance – indeed, it has been
said to be its fundamental object – is to distribute the loss over as wide an area as possible. In other words, the loss is spread over
the country, the disaster to an individual is
shared by many, the disaster to a community
shared by other communities. . . . In assimilation of insurance to a tax, the companies
have been said to be the mere machinery by
which the inevitable losses by fire are distributed so as to fall as lightly as possible on
the public at large, the body of the insured,
not the companies, paying the tax.
German Alliance, 233 U.S. at 412-13. This Court thus
has a long history of treating private insurance as a
quasi-public infrastructure, closely analogous to a
system of collective taxation, and the Court has
therefore allowed insurance to be subject to intensive
regulation even in the face of once-robust substantive
restrictions.
Indeed, several states passed the first compulsory insurance provisions for workers’ compensation

17
and automobile insurance during the same era. Perhaps because this Court had established that insurance was quasi-public, freedom of contract challenges
to these provisions gained no traction. See Alaska
Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S.
532, 541-43 (1935) (noting that a California court had
characterized the state’s workers’ compensation regime as “compulsory insurance” but upholding the
regime against a freedom of contract challenge on the
ground that it merely assigned liabilities); see also In
re Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 566 (1925) (considering possible constitutional infirmities with a proposed compulsory auto insurance law in an advisory
opinion to the New Hampshire legislature and raising
only equal protection and dormant commerce clause
issues, not freedom of contract issues). Even at the
height of the Lochner era, then, compulsory insurance
provisions did not raise libertarian concerns.
Of course, the Lochner-era Court’s special treatment of insurance – and its analogizing of insurance
to taxation – makes tremendous sense. Not only do
insurance pools and tax funds play similar roles of
risk-spreading and cost-sharing, but also, when freeriders and other market failures cause insurance
pools to fail, taxpayers inevitably fill the gap. A
property destroyed by fire that cannot be rebuilt must
be condemned; a non-functioning automobile on the
highway that cannot be towed must be cleared; and a
family left behind after death that cannot self-sustain
must be supported. Similarly, because we have decided as a matter of policy that all Americans with
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emergent medical conditions must be treated, see
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, taxpayers frequently fill expensive gaps when the self-insured are unable to pay, see
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F) (finding that uncompensated care cost $43 billion in 2008). In the end, as the
Lochner Court seemed to understand, requiring individuals to choose between paying into an insurance
pool or contributing an equal or lesser sum to the
national treasury does not actually change their baseline state of freedom. Taxpayers are already paying
for systemic healthcare costs through the lessefficient public safety net.
The longstanding analogy between insurance and
taxation also helps to refute the slippery slope arguments that have arisen in this litigation, including
the District Court’s fear that a finding of constitutionality might allow Congress to require purchases
of anything from broccoli to automobiles. See Florida,
780 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. An important distinguishing
feature of insurance is that it is merely a fiscal pool,
available to protect against economic loss. Unlike a
compelled purchase of broccoli or cars, a mandatory
contribution to an insurance pool does not require the
regulated individual to devote any of her time or
space to keeping, selling, or destroying any physical
object. The imposition on her liberty is thus extremely
small and, again, purely financial. The appropriate
analogy to food markets, then, is not to a broccoli
mandate but rather to farm subsidies, which force all
taxpayers to buy into the agricultural infrastructure
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whether or not they consume the supported products.
And those subsidies can be just as influential on
consumption choices as the minimum coverage provision ever could be; the subsidies for domestic corn
(combined with tariffs on imported sugar) have long
“compel[led],” Florida, 648 F.3d at 1328, Americans to
buy corn syrup instead of sugar. See Tim Worstall,
Big Corn’s HFCS v. Big Sugar’s Sucrose: Maybe Both
Could Lose?, Forbes.com (Dec. 26, 2011).
The Eleventh Circuit and the respondents posit a
second distinction between the minimum coverage
provision and other quasi-public infrastructures:
Private individuals during the Lochner era were not
required to give their money to the quasi-public
entities, like insurance companies, unless they were
likely to use or were in fact using the entities’ services. Car insurance was obligatory only for drivers;
workers’ compensation funds were obligatory only for
employers; and payments to common carriers, bakers,
warehousemen, and grain elevators were obligatory
only for users. The individual mandate, by contrast,
applies to all legal residents of the United States,
regardless of whether they are using or ever will use
the healthcare system. See Florida, 648 F.3d at 129091.
The most that can be said of this distinction,
though, is that it makes the ACA’s statutory scheme
slightly more analogous to mandatory taxation than
the Lochner-era schemes were. There is simply nothing in this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence or in
the text of the Constitution itself that obligates
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regulators to choose user fees over collective contributions to support public or quasi-public infrastructures. So long as the infrastructure in question is a
proper subject of federal regulation and the magnitude of the compelled fee is reasonable, Congress may
choose any regulatory approach it likes. Furthermore,
it makes sense for Congress to choose collective contributions over user fees when all Americans are
extremely likely to benefit from the supported infrastructure at some point and when payments are
difficult to collect from users at the point of service.
National defense is the classic example of an infrastructure with these characteristics, and healthcare
is similar, particularly given individuals’ failures to
save sufficiently for needed care. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 18091(a)(2)(F)-(G) (finding that individuals consumed $43 billion of uncompensated care in 2008 and
that such unsaved-for consumption contributes to 62
percent of personal bankruptcies).
In short, there is nothing in the least bit novel
about relying on private insurance as a quasi-public
infrastructure, nor is there anything novel about
setting rates for and requiring contributions to private insurers in order to fund that infrastructure.
This approach to collective maintenance of public goods has an established history in the United
States, and it is a regulatory approach that has long
been thought to respect even the most stringent
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substantive libertarian constraints.6 Furthermore, it
is an approach that is, as this Court has long acknowledged, closely analogous to the standard federal
function of distributing the costs of national public
goods through taxation.7
Of course, the individual mandate has aroused
considerable public backlash (further bolstering the
analogy to taxation!) because many Americans are
uncomfortable with the perceived requirement that
they enter a private contract. Also, the mandate is
obviously somewhat intrusive of individual freedom
insofar as it directs Americans’ use of their money.
6

This approach fell out of favor during the New Deal era,
as the federal government began to replace quasi-public industry with purely public programs like Social Security. It is
therefore understandable that the regulatory strategy appears
novel to today’s respondents. With the modern push towards privatization and deregulation, however, this approach to supporting public infrastructures might well become more common. The
important point, though, is that quasi-public strategies for
public infrastructures do not now raise nor have they ever raised
implications for individual liberty beyond the generalized restraints that come with all taxation and regulation.
7
Although the Lochner-era Supreme Court treated insurance as a local business that could not be subject to national
regulation, see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), the
Court has since reversed that holding, see United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). It is now
well established that the business of insurance crosses state
lines and therefore falls within Congress’s authority to regulate
interstate commerce. Indeed, the respondents do not allege that
Congress lacks authority to regulate health insurers directly;
they have not challenged the many insurance regulations in the
ACA.
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But “[n]ot every intrusive law is an unconstitutionally intrusive law.” Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 565
(Sutton, J., concurring). The individual mandate
presents no greater threat to liberty than any ordinary requirement to pay for the support of our nation’s infrastructures.
C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Fully
Respects and Preserves Individuals’
Healthcare Autonomy.
One true distinction between the individual mandate and other quasi-public infrastructures is that
the minimum coverage provision regulates health,
which is a regime that has been dedicated to states’
police power, see Florida, 648 F.3d at 1306, as well
as a regime that has received special solicitude in
modern substantive due process jurisprudence, see
Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159
U. Pa. L. Rev. 2209 (2011). Ultimately, however, this
distinction makes no difference. The mandate does
not attempt to influence public health regulation (the
subject that has been state or local) or medical decisionmaking (the subject that receives heightened
substantive protection). The mandate regulates only
healthcare financing.
In the mythology that has arisen around this
case, many commentators have analogized the minimum coverage provision to a requirement that individuals buy broccoli, see generally Einer Elhauge,
Op-Ed., The Broccoli Test, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2011,
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at A35 (noting the prevalence of the broccoli analogy);
Einer Elhauge, The Irrelevance of the Broccoli Argument Against the Individual Mandate, 366 New Eng.
J. Med. e1 (2012) (arguing that the analogy ultimately
fails), while others, including the District Court
below, have also analogized the mandate to a requirement that individuals eat broccoli, Florida, 780
F. Supp. 2d at 1289. As discussed above, it is not at all
clear that the provision compels any purchase at all
because individuals can comply by making an equal
or lesser financial contribution to government; and
even if the provision did require a purchase, the
analogy to broccoli would fail because the mandate
includes no obligation to take ownership or possession of a physical object. Regardless, though, it is beyond cavil that the mandate does not require
consumption of any particular medical care. In other
words, the mandate does not, in fact, require anyone
to eat his broccoli. The minimum coverage provision,
at most, requires individuals to be insured against
certain kinds of sickness and accidents. It does not
require individuals to seek healthcare when they
become sick or have an accident.
The individual mandate, therefore, does nothing
to regulate individuals’ autonomous medical decisions nor anything to regulate public health inputs
or outcomes, nor does it in any way infringe on an
individual’s freedom to reject unwanted medical interventions. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221-22 (1990) (noting that individuals have “a significant liberty interest . . . under the Due Process
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” in rejecting
unwanted medical intervention). The provision is
simply a requirement that all capable individuals
contribute financially to the nation’s healthcare
infrastructure.
Again, the appropriate analogy to food markets is
not to a purchase mandate for broccoli but rather to
the mandatory contributions that all taxpayers make
to the agricultural infrastructure through farm subsidies. Those subsidies flow from taxpayers to private
farmers, not public programs; they are compulsory for
all taxpaying residents; and although they alter the
overall balance of the food supply (in favor of corn
syrup over sugar, for example), the subsidies leave
Americans free to choose what they eat. The only
functional difference between the minimum coverage
provision and farm subsidies is that the mandate
channels financial support directly from taxpayers to
private insurers instead of involving the national
government as a middle man subsidizer. In the end,
just as farm subsidies leave Americans free to eat
whatever they choose, the insurance mandate leaves
Americans free to pursue any course of medical
treatment they choose.
It ought also to be relevant to healthcare autonomy that the individual mandate will increase many
Americans’ access to healthcare, improving rather
than harming their freedom to obtain medical interventions. By mandating universal financial support
for the healthcare infrastructure, the mandate ensures that high quality medical care will always be
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available in the United States. In this sense, too, the
mandate functions like farm subsidies, which have
long been thought necessary to ensure that the food
supply is sufficient to sustain Americans’ freedom to
access adequate nutrition. Because both food and
healthcare are basic human needs, regulations that
improve access to and quality of those goods (without
restricting consumption choices) ought to be understood as fundamentally freedom-enhancing. Furthermore, because purchasing insurance coverage will
constitute compliance with the mandate, many individuals will choose to gain easy financial access to
healthcare by entering an insurance contract, rather
than choosing to continue their reliance on oftenfaulty self-insurance by making a shared responsibility payment. Those individuals will gain significantly
greater capacity to obtain healthcare, even though
they will remain free to reject any healthcare they
don’t want. From the perspective of medical liberty
and healthcare autonomy, thus, the individual mandate improves the baseline state of freedom for the
currently insured and the currently uninsured alike.
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II.

FOR THOSE WHO CHOOSE TO COMPLY
BY PURCHASING INSURANCE, THE ACA
LEAVES THE CONTENTS OF THEIR PURCHASE PRIMARILY TO STATE CONTROL,
PRESERVING STATE POWER OVER THE
ASPECTS OF THE MANDATE THAT MATTER MOST TO LIBERTY.

Although the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted
that both the insurance and healthcare industries fall
“within the sphere of traditional state regulation,”
Florida, 648 F.3d at 1305, the majority opinion grossly exaggerated the minimum coverage provision’s
departure from that traditional baseline. Indeed, the
opinion merely asserted, without citation or elaboration, “that the individual mandate supersedes a
multitude of the states’ policy choices in these key
areas of traditional state concern.” Id. at 1306.
Of course, the mandate itself does no such thing.
Whether viewed as a standardized contribution to the
healthcare infrastructure or as a purchase mandate
for an insurance product, the individual mandate
itself, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a), says nothing at all
about the nature of the insurance at issue, much less
about the nature of the medical care that such insurance will cover, cf. § 5000A(f) (defining “minimum essential coverage” broadly to include any legal, comprehensive health insurance product). It is instead
the ACA’s other insurance regulations, including the
definition of “essential health benefits” found elsewhere in the statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022, that regulate the insurance products one can buy in complying
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with the mandate. But the respondents do not allege
here or anywhere else that those insurance regulations exceed Congress’s Article I powers. Indeed,
under this Court’s holding in South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533, Congress has clear authority to
regulate the contents and practices of any insurance
contract bought or sold in the United States. It is only
the supposed additional requirement that legal residents enter such contracts that is in dispute here.
That said, the ACA’s overall regulatory approach
to health insurance and healthcare is, in one sense,
relevant to the mandate’s implications for individual
liberty: The greater the range of options available to
individuals and states for complying with the mandate, the less concerned this Court needs to be that
the mandate represents a coercive exercise of a federal police power. Cf. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1309 (worrying that a finding of constitutional validity would
“vest Congress with a general police power”). It is
thus highly relevant that the ACA, notwithstanding
the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusory assertion to the
contrary, preserves significant state authority over
both insurance and care. Because states have authority to diversify in regulating the contents of insurance
contracts, individuals could have essentially limitless
options for compliance with the mandate.
State diversification is possible through two avenues. First, the ACA preserves state authority over
the aspects of public health and healthcare regulation
that historically have been delegated to states’ police
power – a point that cuts in favor of constitutionality
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under the Necessary and Proper Clause, see United
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1958-61 (2010)
(stressing the importance to Necessary and Proper
Clause analysis of the statute’s degree of departure
from traditional areas of federal concern), and that
eviscerates the Eleventh Circuit’s fear of a national
police power. Second, the ACA provides the states
with many opportunities for asserting their citizens’
interests through national political and administrative processes, providing additional prospects for
interstate diversification through the ACA regulatory
structure as well as providing further support for
constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, see id. at 1962-63 (noting that a statute is
more likely to be constitutional if it “accounts for
state interests”).
A. The Minimum Coverage Provision Preserves the States’ Historic Police Power
in the Regimes that are Most Important
to Individual Liberty.
The Eleventh Circuit correctly noted that healthcare and insurance regulation traditionally fall within the police power of the states. But not all statutes
that relate to healthcare or insurance implicate that
power, as should be apparent from the multitude of
federal healthcare and health insurance regulations
already on the books. See, e.g., Women’s Health and
Cancer Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 902,
112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Health
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Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 101 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996) (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C.); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.); Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended in
42 U.S.C.) (establishing Medicare); Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), Pub. L. No.
717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in 21
U.S.C.). The states’ police power, then, has been and
ought to be limited to those exercises of regulatory
power that truly coerce individuals. Although the
ACA sets a federal floor for some insurance regulations, the statute preserves the nearly exclusive state
authority over medical regulation (such as licensure,
vaccination, and quarantine), and it preserves significant state authority over insurance regulation, including the core state power to license insurers.
1. States retain their nearly exclusive
authority over regulation of medicine.
Although it is well established that the power to
regulate healthcare and public health traditionally
rests with the states, that tradition does not encompass all regulations related to healthcare. The tradition historically covers only true medical regulation,
such as licensure of doctors and hospitals, and true
public health regulation, such as mandatory vaccination and quarantine. Indeed, the cases that the
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Eleventh Circuit cited in asserting the police power
over healthcare – and the cases in which this Court
has emphasized that state power – relate to one of
those two regulatory regimes. The relevant cases concern regulations that seek to ensure the safety and
efficacy of medical interventions and regulations that
seek to prevent the spread of disease. See Florida,
648 F.3d at 1305 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243 (2006) (safety and efficacy of physician-assisted
suicide); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (safety
of abortion clinics); Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560 (1991) (clothing mandates for exotic dancers); Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 374
U.S. 424 (1963) (safety of optometrists through licensure regulations); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S.
442 (1954) (safety of physicians through licensure
regulations); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (mandatory vaccination)); Florida, 648 F.3d at
1306 (citing Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (safety of blood donation), as well as insurance cases not relevant in this
subsection); see also Oregon-Washington R.R. &
Navigation v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 93-96 (1926)
(noting that state police power includes quarantine,
notwithstanding impact on interstate commerce, unless Congress has exercised conflicting control by
statute).
Both of those categories of power – both medical
regulation and public health regulation – remain
untouched under the ACA. The statute says nothing about disease control; it leaves the licensure of
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hospitals, doctors, and other medical practitioners
entirely to the states; and it does nothing to shift
safety and quality regulations to the federal government beyond the shift accomplished long ago in the
FDCA. Although the ACA does create a grant program to encourage state experimentation with alternative medical malpractice regimes, the states are
free to refuse those grants. 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g-15.
Overall, the ACA requires no change in state regulations of medical care.
The core police power over healthcare, thus, remains entirely intact. All of medical regulation remains as much in state hands as it was before the
ACA. States therefore remain primarily in charge of
an individual’s freedom to obtain or to reject medical
treatments – the aspects of healthcare regulation
that potentially implicate modern substantive due
process. See generally Moncrieff, supra. Once individuals buy insurance policies to comply with the
federal mandate, their access to and interactions with
medical care will be subject to state rather than federal oversight, just as they always have been. As a
result, if an individual dislikes her state’s medical
regulatory regime, she will be free to move to a different state with a different approach, and she will also
be free to appeal to her smaller state government for
policy change. The benefits of federalism to medical
freedom, thus, are entirely untouched by the ACA and
its individual mandate.
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2. States retain significant authority
over insurance regulation.
The ACA obviously does more to regulate insurance than medical care, but the statute nevertheless
preserves significant state authority over insurance
practice. Indeed, the states retain primary authority
to define the range of products available to their
citizens for complying with the individual mandate.
Most importantly, the ACA does nothing to disrupt the longstanding state power over insurance
licensure. See Christopher C. Jennings & Katherine
J. Hayes, Health Insurance Reform and the Tensions
of Federalism, 362 New Eng. J. Med. 2244, 2245
(2010) (noting that states will continue licensing insurers). Under the ACA, a state may refuse to allow
any given insurance company to write and sell policies within its borders. The states thus possess – and
retain after the ACA – an absolute power of exclusion
that they can use to control the health insurance
products available to their citizens. The ACA obviously imposes some new limits on the contents and
practices of insurance policies, as we discuss below,
but the states retain an important power to exclude
from their markets any insurance company or product that the state or its citizens dislike. Moreover,
after extensive state lobbying during the passage of
the ACA, Congress opted not to repeal the McCarranFerguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006), which
continues to exempt insurance from federal antitrust
regulations. See Jonathan Dinan, Shaping Health
Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient
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Protection and Affordable Care Act, 41 Publius 395,
399, 412-13 (2011). Any state that chooses to do
so, therefore, may create an insurance monopoly or
oligopoly within its borders without fear of federal
intervention.
Of course, the ACA includes a new requirement
that licensed insurance products be available for purchase through “American Health Benefit Exchanges,”
42 U.S.C.A. § 18031, but it leaves the states with
tremendous flexibility in designing and governing
those exchanges. See generally Jon Kingsdale & John
Bertko, Insurance Exchanges Under Health Reform:
Six Design Issues for the States, 29 Health Aff. 1158
(2010). Indeed, the most fundamental choices about
exchange design are up to state discretion. States can
choose among a state-specific exchange, a federal
exchange, and a multi-state regional exchange, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 18031(f), 18041(c); they may establish
multiple exchanges within their borders, § 18031(f);
and they may decide whether or not to allow large
group insurers to sell policies through the exchange,
§ 18032(f)(2). In short, just as the range of products is
left to states to determine through licensure, so too is
the interface for consumer purchases left to the states
to design through exchange governance. The ordinary
American’s experience of purchasing insurance to
comply with the mandate can therefore be governed
almost entirely by the states.
Furthermore, it is already clear that the states
will diverge in their exchange designs. See generally
National Conference of State Legislatures, State
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Actions to Implement Health Exchanges (Nov. 2011).
Some states’ exchanges will be non-profit private
entities; some will be public-private partnerships;
some will be new states agencies; some will run
through existing state agencies. Id. Some states’
exchanges will work as “active purchasers” of insurance, buying large-group plans on behalf of exchange
enrollees, while others will work as “open marketplaces,” allowing any licensed insurer in the state to
make its product available through the exchange. Id.
The ACA thus allows for interstate diversity and
experimentation in the insurance marketplace, providing each citizen with an exit opportunity if she
dislikes her state’s insurance options or exchange
interface. In short, the ACA leaves significant power
over health insurance regulation in the hands of the
smaller subunits of government, allowing citizens to
retain a strong voice in insurance regulation “without
having to rely solely upon the political processes that
control a remote central power.” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at
2364.
Admittedly, the ACA sets a federal floor on the
categories of benefits that must be included in many
insurance contracts, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6(a)
(requiring individual and small-group plans to include
the “essential health benefits package”); § 18011(a) (exempting grandfathered plans); § 18022(a) (defining
the “essential health benefits package”), and it sets
a federal ceiling on the administrative costs (including profits) that insurers are allowed to incur, see
§ 300gg-18(b) (setting a minimum medical-loss ratio
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of 85% for large-group plans and 80% for individual
and small-group plans, effectively allowing insurers
to spend 15-20% of their intake on administration
and profit). The ACA also establishes new federal
bans on many once-common insurance practices, including caps on annual and lifetime benefits, § 300gg11, exclusions for preexisting conditions, § 300gg-3,
rescissions of plans for reasons other than fraud,
§ 300gg-12, refusals to issue or renew policies for individuals, §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-2, 300gg-4(a), and practices of medical underwriting based on factors other
than age, tobacco use, and geography, §§ 300gg(a)(1),
300gg-4(b).
These insurance regulations, however, do not
represent a presumptuous federal takeover of state
police power. Instead, they represent the culmination
of many years of state experimentation with insurance reform, which has been necessary to address
market failures that allow too many sleights of hand
by insurers at patients’ expense. But many of the
states’ regulatory attempts have experienced limited
success because insurance companies can leave the
states that regulate them in favor of states with laxer
regimes. See generally Conrad F. Meier, Destroying
Insurance Markets: How Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating Destroyed the Individual Health
Insurance Market in Eight States, Council for Affordable Health Insurance passim (2005). In other words,
the story has been a classic race to the bottom requiring some federal standardization. The ACA accomplishes that standardization while preserving state
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flexibility to innovate and diversify above the federal
floor. Furthermore, the ACA leaves the states with
primary enforcement power for all of these regulations, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22, allowing coercive
regulatory power to remain primarily in state rather
than federal hands.
In short, much of the states’ core police power
over insurance remains intact after the ACA, including the central power of licensure. The ACA puts very
little coercive regulatory power in federal hands, and
it preserves opportunities for interstate differentiation in insurance regulation. The ordinary American’s
experience in complying with the individual mandate,
thus, will be colored largely by state rather than
federal regulation, leaving citizens with many opportunities to influence their health insurance options
without resort to the “remote central power” of the
federal government. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
B. The ACA Provides States with Political
and Administrative Avenues to Influence the ACA’s Development and to Innovate Beyond the ACA.
Of course, while the “political processes that
control a remote central power,” id., may be entirely
inaccessible or frustratingly unresponsive from an
individual voter’s perspective, state governments are
quite capable of penetrating and influencing those
processes on their citizens’ behalf. A federal statute
that provides clear avenues for state participation in
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the federal regulatory regime is therefore less implicative of a federal police power than a federal statute
that occupies the regulatory space to the exclusion of
the states. The ACA provides several such avenues, in
two broad categories.
First and most obviously, the ACA provides for
“state innovation waivers,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18052,
empowering the Secretary of Health & Human Services (“Secretary”) to excuse individual states from
most of the ACA’s regulatory requirements, as long as
the state comes up with a different way to achieve
comparable results. If the majority of a state’s citizens strongly dislike the individual mandate, then,
they are not reduced to lobbying Congress for repeal
of the minimum coverage provision; they can also ask
their state government to apply for a waiver, replacing the mandate with a more liberty-protective option
for universal coverage. See generally Office of the
Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The Affordable Care Act: Supporting Innovation, Empowering States (Feb. 28,
2011). A similar waiver scheme has allowed for interstate diversity in Medicaid programs, see Frank J.
Thompson & Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism
and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications
for Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. Health Pol.
Pol’y & L. 971 (2007), indicating that the Secretary’s
oversight does not stifle states’ ability to represent
their citizens’ needs and preferences.
A second broad feature of the ACA is equally
important but subtler: By placing primary enforcement power in states’ hands, the ACA gives the states
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tremendous leverage to influence the everyday administration of the ACA’s regulatory scheme. See
generally Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as
the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2076 (2008)
(noting that “responsibility for program implementation and enforcement appears to enhance state influence over federal agency decisionmaking”). The point
here is different from the point above that leaving
enforcement with the states helps to preserve the core
of their police power. Here, the idea is that preserving
state enforcement power forces federal administrators to be responsive to state demands. This aspect of
state leverage in the federal-state relationship has
already manifested in a dramatic and surprising way;
the Department of Health & Human Services recently announced that it will not promulgate federal
regulations to define the benefits required under the
broad categories of “essential health benefits” but will
instead leave that task to the states. Robert Pear,
Health Care Law Will Let States Tailor Benefits, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 2011, at A1.
Within the ACA’s regulatory regime, then, the
states will have many opportunities to shape healthcare and insurance regulation to their citizens’ needs
and preferences. The Eleventh Circuit’s fear that the
ACA “forecloses the States from experimenting and
exercising their own judgment” is therefore entirely
misplaced. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Although
the ACA channels some of that experimentation and
judgment through federal administrative processes,
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the states retain many opportunities to experiment
and diversify on their citizens’ behalf. Individuals
with particular healthcare and health insurance
needs, thus, will not need to appeal to the “remote
central power,” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364, for accommodation; they will be able to accomplish anything
they need through state action. In short, even if most
individuals will comply with the mandate by purchasing a product, the nature and content of that product
is left largely to state control.
*

*

*

Given the structure of the individual mandate as
well as the structure of the ACA as a whole, the
minimum coverage provision presents no threat to individual liberty nor to the states’ authority to protect
that liberty. The mandate is merely a standardized
obligation for all able taxpayers to make a financial
contribution to the national healthcare infrastructure. The provision is thus indistinguishable from an
ordinary tax in terms of its imposition on liberty.
Furthermore, for those Americans who choose to make
their mandatory contribution to a private health insurer instead of making a shared responsibility
payment to government, their experience of purchasing insurance will be shaped primarily by state
rather than federal regulation. If citizens are unhappy with the perceived purchase mandate, they will
have many opportunities to accomplish change through
their state representatives, “without having to rely

40
solely upon the political processes that control a
remote central power.” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we urge the Court to
reverse the Eleventh Circuit and direct entry of
judgment for the petitioners on the constitutional
validity of the minimum coverage provision.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW M. FISCHER
Counsel of Record for the Amici Curiae
JASON & FISCHER
47 Winter Street
Boston, MA 02108

